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ESSAY
Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection:
Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets
Barbara Black*
“[M]y questions about the stock market have hardened into a larger
puzzle: a major industry appears to be built largely on an illusion of
skill.”1

– Daniel Kahneman
The judicial view of a “reasonable investor” plays an important role
in federal securities regulation. Courts express great confidence in the
reasonable investor’s cognitive abilities, a view not shared by
behavioral economists. Similarly, the efficient market hypothesis has
exerted a powerful influence in securities regulation, although empirical
evidence calls into question some of the basic assumptions underlying
it. Unfortunately, to date, courts have acknowledged the discrepancy
between legal theory and behavioral economics only in one situation:
class certification of federal securities class actions. It is time for courts
to address the gap between judicial expectations about the behavior of
reasonable investors and behavioral economists’ views of investors’
cognitive shortcomings, consistent with the central purpose of federal
securities regulation: protecting investors from fraud.
I. THE RATIONALITY OF THE “REASONABLE INVESTOR”: LAW AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
The elements of a private federal securities fraud claim under Rule
10b-5 include a misstatement of a material fact and the investor’s

* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. This Essay was prepared for the Second Annual Institute for Investor
Protection Conference, “Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection,” held at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law on October 5, 2012. Many thanks to Michael Kaufman,
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, for inviting me to participate in the Conference.
1. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 212 (2011).
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reliance on that misstatement.2 Because materiality is defined as
information that a reasonable investor would consider important in
making investment decisions,3 the reasonable investor standard serves
to distinguish between material and immaterial statements and hence to
determine defendants’ disclosure obligations. The Supreme Court tells
us that courts should not treat reasonable investors like “nitwits”4 and
ascribe to them “child-like simplicity.”5 In the same vein, courts have
stated disclosure should not be tailored to “what is fit for rubes.”6 To
the contrary, defendants can engage in optimistic sales talk with
impunity; since reasonable investors will not be misled by puffery, it is
immaterial as a matter of law.7 Similarly, corporations and securities
salesmen are not required to disclose information that should be obvious
to reasonable investors. Thus, courts tell us that reasonable investors
“can do the math” to figure out the financial bottom line in at least some
circumstances.8 Additionally, courts expect reasonable investors to
have an awareness of general economic conditions9 and to understand
the principle of diversification,10 the time-value of money,11 the nature
of margin accounts,12 and the securities industry’s compensation
2. More precisely, the elements of a private Rule 10b-5 claim are: “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317–18 (2011) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)).
3. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality in
the context of omissions from proxy statements as what a reasonable shareholder would consider
important in deciding how to vote); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting
the TSC standard for materiality in cases of misrepresentations influencing an investor’s decision
to sell).
4. Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)).
5. Id.
6. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987).
7. Bogart v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 1036 (LBS) (NG), 1995 WL 46399, at
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1995). But see Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 99, 112–18 (2005) (arguing that the current judicial treatment of puffery is flawed
because it neglects the power of puffery to alter moods).
8. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2005) (treating a
piecemeal disclosure requiring mathematical calculations and assumptions as a factual disclosure
of the solution); Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures
that Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927, 943–44 (2007)
(explaining how courts apply the general rule that failure to perform mathematical calculations
for investors is not a material omission).
9. In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 377 (3d Cir. 1993).
10. Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1993).
11. Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998).
12. Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984).
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structure.13 In short, courts hold investors to a high standard of
rationality that may not comport with observed reality.14 Recent studies
consistently show that retail investors lack basic financial literacy.15
The judicial view of a reasonable investor is also important in
delineating the reliance element of a private Rule 10b-5 claim. From
Rule 10b-5’s early days, courts required investors to establish reliance
on a material misstatement because otherwise securities laws would
create a “scheme of investors’ insurance.”16 The treatment of reliance
in private securities fraud actions, however, differs significantly from
common law tort principles. At common law, victims of fraud did not
have to establish “reasonable” reliance, which is an objective standard.
Instead, they had to prove “justifiable” reliance,17 which is “a matter of
the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the
circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a
community standard of conduct to all cases.”18 Moreover, under
common law, “a person is justified in relying on a representation of fact
‘although he might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had
he made an investigation.’”19 Courts, however, have taken a less
forgiving view under federal securities laws and imposed greater due
diligence responsibilities on investors.20 For example, a widow with a
13. Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 946 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1991).
14. See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the
Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L.
REV. 473, 473 (2006) (describing the judicial characterization of the reasonable investor as a
“savvy person who grasps market fundamentals”); David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a
Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 538–39 (2006) (describing the “rationality burden”
courts impose on investors).
15. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG
INVESTORS, at vii–viii (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financialliteracy-study-part1.pdf.
16. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (adopting a subjective
standard of reliance). See also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005)
(explaining that the purpose of securities law is “to protect [investors] against those economic
losses that misrepresentations actually cause”).
17. Professor Dobbs agrees that “[r]eliance upon the defendant’s material representations is
ordinarily justified unless the plaintiff is on notice that the statement is not to be trusted or knows
the statement to be false.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 474, at 1359 (2000). However,
he takes issue with the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ description of justifiable reliance as
subjective in all instances. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 672, at 669 (2d ed.
2011).
18. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
545A, cmt. b (1976)).
19. Id. at 70 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976)).
20. Under section 21D(f)(10)(A)(i)(II) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(f)(10)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (2006), a person “knowingly commits a violation of securities laws” based
on an untrue statement of material fact when he has actual knowledge that the representation is
false and persons are likely to “reasonably rely” on the misrepresentation.
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tenth grade education was expected to read and understand written
disclosures about risk and illiquidity in a lengthy complex prospectus
rather than rely on oral representations of suitability made by her
broker.21
Behavioral economists, by contrast, do not observe real people
investing in today’s markets behaving as the reasonable investors that
federal securities law expects them to be.22 These cognitive errors
affect decisions made by both retail investors and financial practitioners
and go beyond issues of financial literacy. Studies show that many
investors are not rational in their decision-making; there are observable
biases resulting from departures from rational decision-making.23
Researchers have compiled an extensive catalogue of investors’
cognitive errors. These include: loss aversion (investors are reluctant to
sell losing stocks even when advantageous for them to do so),24
overconfidence (investors, particularly male investors, are
overconfident in their investment strategies),25 and representativeness
heuristic (investors chase trends believing they have systematic
causes).26 More generally, the nature of investing itself may induce
investors to treat it as a game or as gambling.27 To date, courts have not
acknowledged this gap between judicial expectations about the behavior

21. See Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350–51 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983)) (applying an objective test in determining when the
widowed plaintiff should have had constructive notice of fraud for purposes of the statute of
limitations); Kosovich v. Metro Homes, No. 09 Civ. 6992 (JSR), 2009 WL 5171737, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (stating that the plaintiff’s “professed financial cluelessness is beside
the point if he acted unreasonably”), aff’d, 405 F. App’x. 540 (2d Cir. 2010). See also Barbara
Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1038 n.303 (2002) (listing cases where summary judgment was
awarded for broker-dealer due to lack of justifiable reliance).
22. See generally MEIR STATMAN, WHAT INVESTORS REALLY WANT (2011) (describing how
cognitive errors and emotions drive investment decisions); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED
AND FEAR (2000) (describing how behavioral heuristics, biases, errors, and framing affect how
financial practitioners make investment decisions).
23. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 723 (2003) [hereinafter MOME II].
24. Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN. 1775, 1781–
95 (1998).
25. Terrance Odean, Do Investors Trade Too Much?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1279, 1280–92
(1999); Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and
Security Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839, 1844–45 (1998).
26. David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533, 1545–46
(2001).
27. See STATMAN, supra note 22, at 56 (“Profits are the utilitarian benefits of winning the
beat-the-market game, and cognitive errors and emotions mislead us into thinking that winning is
easy. But we are also drawn into the game by the promise of expressive and emotional
benefits.”).
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of reasonable investors and behavioral economists’ views of investors’
cognitive shortcomings.
II. RELIANCE AND THE “FRAUD ON THE MARKET” PRESUMPTION
The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulties in establishing
reliance in securities fraud actions and has mitigated the burden on
investors in two circumstances. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States28 held that if there is an omission of a material fact by one
with a duty to disclose, the investor to whom the duty was owed need
not provide specific proof of reliance.29 The Affiliated Ute presumption
is of limited utility, however, since courts generally treat allegations of
misleading disclosure as misrepresentation and not nondisclosure
claims.30 In addition, courts may not recognize a duty to disclose
material information in the absence of a traditional fiduciary
relationship.31
The second situation in which there is a rebuttable presumption of
reliance is the fraud-on-the-market presumption set forth in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson.32 If the plaintiffs meet the prerequisites of fraud-on-themarket, it is presumed that the misleading information is reflected in the
market price at the time of the transaction. Although it is available in
both individual and class actions, the fraud-on-the-market presumption
assumes great importance in Rule 10b-5 class actions because otherwise
individual questions of reliance would predominate and claims of
multiple investors could not be aggregated in a class action.33 To
invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption, plaintiffs must show that

28. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Affiliated Ute addressed the reliance requirement in a case involving
rather unusual facts. Plaintiffs, mixed-bloods of the Ute Indian Tribe, sued a bank and two of its
employees. Id. at 140. The bank had acted as a transfer agent for stock of a corporation formed
for the purpose of distributing tribal assets. Id. at 13637. Although the attorneys of the
corporation requested that the bank discourage resales of the stock, the bank’s employees actively
encouraged a secondary market among non-Indians. Id. at 14546, 152. Additionally, the
defendants “devised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders of [the] stock to dispose of their
shares without disclosing to them material facts that reasonably could have been expected to
influence their decisions to sell.” Id. at 153.
29. Id. at 153–54 (“Under the circumstances of this case . . . positive proof of reliance is not a
prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material . . . . This
obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of
causation of fact.”).
30. Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999).
31. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”).
32. Id. at 241–47.
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over questions affecting individual members of the class).
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the stock traded in an efficient market,34 the alleged misrepresentation
was publicly known, and the transaction took place between the time
the misrepresentation was made and the time the truth was discovered.35
Apart from the “truth on the market” defense, which refutes the
materiality of the misleading disclosure by showing that other
information in the marketplace ameliorated its effect,36 it is not clear
how the fraud-on-the-market presumption can be rebutted.37 Short
sellers illustrate the difficulty. If, in response to corporate disclosures,
they are selling shares when most traders are buying, it can be argued
that short sellers are not relying on those disclosures.38 On the other
hand, short sellers may disbelieve management’s statements without
necessarily believing that the disclosures are fraudulent, in which case
they are relying on the integrity of the market price and have suffered an
injury by trading the stock at a distorted price.39
In the early post-Basic years, it could plausibly be argued that the
fraud-on-the-market presumption was best understood as eliminating
reliance as a required element in securities fraud actions (at least in
those involving secondary trading in publicly traded securities) and
placing the analytical emphasis on causation.40 The Supreme Court,
however, distinguished between reliance and loss causation in Dura

34. Courts generally apply the factors set forth in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264,
1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989): the average weekly trading volume; the number of analysts following the
security; the extent to which market makers traded the security; the issuer’s eligibility to file a
Form S-3 registration statement; and the cause-and-effect relationship between material
disclosures and changes in the security’s price. Additional factors include the company’s market
capitalization; the size of the public float; the ability to short sell the security; and the level of
autocorrelation. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011). See also
Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (considering the difference between
the price at which investors are willing to buy the security versus the price at which they are
willing to sell, along with the size of the float for the security).
35. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011). Proof of
materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a securities fraud class action. Amgen Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195–97 (2013).
36. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000).
37. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at
a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”).
38. See Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, 836 F.2d 818, 821–23 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the
fraud-on-the-market presumption was not available to a short seller, who instead must establish
actual reliance).
39. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendants’
arguments that short sellers could be excluded from the class).
40. See generally Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in
Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 923 (1988) (arguing that fraud-on-the-market is best
conceptualized in terms of causation rather than reliance).
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo41 and Erica P. John Fund v.
Halliburton.42 Halliburton, in particular, reaffirmed the traditional role
of reliance in establishing a connection between the misrepresentation
and the injury.43
III. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
The efficient market hypothesis has exerted a powerful influence on
securities regulation.44 Its basic tenets can be succinctly stated. In
efficient markets, securities prices fully reflect available information
because “professionally-informed traders quickly notice and take
advantage of mispricing, thereby driving prices back to their proper
level.”45 The efficient market hypothesis, therefore, is grounded in
three assumptions:
First, investors are assumed to be rational and hence to value securities
rationally. Second, to the extent that some investors are not rational,
their trades are random and therefore cancel each other out without
affecting prices. Third, to the extent that investors are irrational in
similar ways, they are met in the market by rational arbitrageurs who
eliminate their influence on prices.46

According to behavioral finance scholars, however, “many investors
are not rational in their financial decision-making, . . . there are
observable directional biases resulting from departures from rational
decision-making, and . . . significant barriers prevent professional
traders from fully correcting the mistakes made by less than rational
investors.”47 Accordingly, in contrast to the efficient market hypothesis,
behavioral finance theory asserts that “systematic and significant
deviations from efficiency are expected to persist for long periods of

41. 544 U.S. 336, 342–44 (2005). Dura held that an inflated purchase price does not itself
prove causation and loss because precedent also requires a showing that the plaintiff would not
have invested had he known the truth. Id.
42. 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). Halliburton clarified that “[l]oss causation addresses a
matter different from whether an investor relied on a misrepresentation,” as reliance focuses on
the facts surrounding an investor’s decision to take part in the transaction. Id.
43. Id.
44. The literature on the efficient market hypothesis, from both economists and legal scholars,
is voluminous. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549–50 & nn.1–5 (1984) (discussing the legal field’s acceptance
of the efficient market hypothesis and listing sources in which the efficient market hypothesis is
discussed); MOME II, supra note 23 (analyzing the framework for market efficiency).
45. MOME II, supra note 23, at 723.
46. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
2 (2000).
47. MOME II, supra note 23, at 723–24.
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time.”48
Indeed, empirical evidence does call into question basic assumptions
underlying the efficient market hypothesis. As discussed earlier, it is
increasingly difficult to sustain the case that investors act rationally in
making investment decisions.49 Moreover, there are difficulties in
assessing how markets react to information. For example, it is a basic
assumption that open and developed markets are sufficiently efficient so
that publicly available material information affects stock prices. Yet
there are documented instances where this is not the case, as where the
market did not react to publicly available information about the impact
of a breakthrough in cancer research on a corporation until the New
York Times wrote about it more than five months after the original
release.50 Studies report examples of persistent mispricing, as where
securities or their equivalents trade at different prices in different
markets, even though arbitrage should correct these mispricings.51
Finally, there is skepticism about whether investors rely on publicly
available information (even indirectly) because “more than news seems
to move stock prices.”52
In short, contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, behavioral
economics asserts that investors’ deviations from economic rationality
are highly pervasive and systematic53 and that real-world arbitrage is
risky and limited, unable to restore rationality to the markets.54

48. SHLEIFER, supra note 46, at 2.
49. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (discussing examples of non-rational
investment strategies).
50. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 509–10 (2006). See also Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 173–74 [hereinafter Langevoort, Basic
at Twenty] (discussing the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ securities fraud class action because of the
market’s initial lack of reaction to news about Merck’s revenues).
51. See Dunbar & Heller, supra note 50, at 478–79 (describing the persistent mispricing of
two stocks, Royal Dutch and Shell Transport, that are backed by the same operating assets). See
generally Philip S. Russel, The Enigma of Closed-End Funds Pricing: Twenty-Six Years Later, 16
INT’L J. FIN. 2985 (2004) (finding that theories do not account for persistent mispricing of closedend funds relative to net asset value).
52. SHLEIFER, supra note 46, at 20 (noting that the 1987 market crash, when stocks dropped
sharply and suddenly without any new information, is difficult to explain consistent with the
efficient market hypothesis).
53. Id. at 12 (citing Kahneman and Tversky’s research to show that “[i]nvestor sentiment
reflects the common judgment errors made by a substantial number of investors, rather than
uncorrelated random mistakes”).
54. Id. at 13. Gilson and Kraakman acknowledge that they underestimated institutional limits
on arbitrage. MOME II, supra note 23, at 736.
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IV. RETHINKING BASIC IN LIGHT OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
It is frequently stated that the efficient market hypothesis is the
underpinning of the fraud-on-the-market presumption; market
efficiency has been described as “the cornerstone” of the fraud-on-theIn recent years, “[judicial] inquiry into
market presumption.55
efficiency has tended towards the zealous.”56 As one example, the First
Circuit in In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation held: “For
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, we conclude that an
efficient market is one in which the market price of the stock fully
reflects all publicly available information.”57 As another example, a
New Jersey federal district court held:
The Efficient Market Hypothesis . . . is premised on the belief that
individuals are rational, self-governing actors who are able to process
the information wisely, and they do so promptly. . . . The [Efficient
Market] Hypothesis assumes that investors are rational risk calculators
who consistently weigh the costs and benefits of alternatives and
select the best option, thus causing the market’s immediate reaction to
any financially-important news.58

In short, rather than confining their scrutiny to objective market factors
evidencing relative efficiency,59 some courts now require markets to
live up to the impossibly high standard of the hypothetical reasonable
investor who justifiably relies on corporate disclosures “wisely” and
“promptly.” A market cannot live up to this standard any more than an
investor can.60
To date, there have been only a handful of cases that refer to
behavioral economics or behavioral finance in the context of class
certification of securities fraud class actions.61 These cases predict that
behavioral finance may lead to the demise of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption:
55. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated by Amgen Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
56. DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 163 (3d ed. 2003).
57. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (requiring
informational, not fundamental, efficiency).
58. In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670, 696 (D.N.J. 2006) (internal citations
omitted).
59. See supra note 34 (listing relevant market factors).
60. See Bradford Cornell, Market Efficiency and Securities Litigation: Implications of the
Appellate Decision in Thane, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 237, 254 (2011) (criticizing courts for
viewing market efficiency as a yes-or-no question, rather than relatively and contextually).
61. Indeed, at this Conference, the practitioners on the investor protection panel (one from the
defense bar, one from plaintiffs’ bar) agreed on the irrelevance of economic theory “in the
trenches.”
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The emerging field of behavioral finance suggests that differing
investor assessments of value appear to be the rule, rather than the
exception. Because the notion of information efficiency upon which
the fraud-on-the-market presumption rests is crumbling under
sustained academic scrutiny, the future of securities fraud class action
litigation—dependent on this presumption—may be in jeopardy.62

Similarly, this “emphasis on the rarity of efficient markets . . . would
have the likely effect of making it unduly difficult to establish the fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance.”63
I submit, however, that the persuasive power of Basic does not
depend on acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis. It is true that
Basic refers to the efficient market hypothesis to acknowledge that “in
an open and developed securities market, the price of the company’s
stock is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business . . . [and] [m]isleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not
directly rely on the misstatements.”64
At its core, however, Basic is a pragmatic, not a theoretical, opinion
based on the purposes of federal securities laws, including the
protection of investors and the enhancement of investor confidence.
These purposes are furthered through full and accurate disclosure of
material information. The securities fraud class action plays an
important role in carrying out these purposes.65 The Basic decision
rests on the common sense propositions that “there cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity”66 and the “fundamental purpose” of
the Securities Exchange Act is “implementing a philosophy of full
disclosure.”67 “Arising out of considerations of fairness, public policy,
and probability, as well as judicial economy, presumptions are also

62. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 n.10 (D. Mass. 2006)
(citation omitted), on remand from 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
63. Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005).
64. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also id. at 244 (“[T]he market is performing a substantial part of
the valuation process performed by an investor in a face-to-face transaction” (quoting In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980))).
65. As Professor Langevoort expresses it:
If Basic’s presumption is essentially an entitlement to rely on the market price as
undistorted by fraud, it is hard to see why investors should lose that entitlement simply
because of some market imperfection. To the contrary, these kinds of imperfections
would seem to strengthen, not weaken, the need for additional investor protection.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 50, at 176.
66. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230.
67. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977)).
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useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties.”68
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Basic concluded that the
“presumption of reliance employed in this case is consistent with, and
by facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports, the congressional policy
embodied in the [Securities Exchange] Act.”69 Consistent with this
pragmatic approach, the Court did not find it necessary to set forth a
rigorous test for market efficiency. Rather, it stated: “We need only
believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies.”70
Basic, of course, was decided in 1988. Detractors of the opinion urge
reconsideration because of additional knowledge about how markets
really work. In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Funds &
Trusts,71 which addressed the question whether proof of materiality is
required at the class certification stage, corporate defendants and their
advocates urged the Court to seize the opportunity to rethink the fraudon-the-market presumption and cited “the modesty of the economic
reasoning that undergirds Basic’s presumption”72 as grounds to tighten
the requirements for class certification in securities fraud class actions.
A majority of the Justices, however, recognized that Congress addressed
the policy question in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA) and rejected calls to eliminate the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.73 Nevertheless, it is likely that challenges to the fraud-onthe-market presumption on the basis of behavioral finance will
continue.
I believe, however, that this debate over competing economic
theories, while important and interesting, has nothing to do with the
continuing viability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.74 Rather,
68. Id. at 245.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 246 n.24.
71. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
72. Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and Biotechnology Industry
Organization Supporting Petitioners at 28, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S.
Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-1085).
73. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1201. Specifically, the Court stated that through PSLRA, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)),
Congress “recognized that although private securities-fraud litigation furthers important public
policy interests, prime among them, deterring wrongdoing and providing restitution to defrauded
investors, such lawsuits have also been subject to abuse,” including frivolous claims to extract
large settlements. Amgen, 131 S. Ct. at 1200.
74. I am not the first to make this argument. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories,
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851,
895 (1992) (explaining that the efficient market hypothesis is not meant to be used as a predictor
of the behavior of individual investors).
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Basic has two enduring messages.
First, it does not make sense for investors to spend their time poring
through lengthy and densely written disclosure documents. Investors
get information from many sources; perhaps their investing is informed
by advice from their financial advisers, by reading financial articles, or
by Internet chat rooms. Given the variety and complexity of available
information, the difficulty of evaluating this information, and the many
other demands placed on investors’ time and energy, investors can
reasonably decide it is sensible to treat stock prices as indicative of the
stock’s value. Accordingly, it is sufficient to believe that “market
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
statements about companies.”75 As two commentators express it:
Reliance on the integrity of the market price is sensibly presumed . . .
if the market bears enough hallmarks of efficiency that investors,
mindful of the costs they would incur if they went out and conducted
their own research into stock values, reasonably could decide instead
to treat the market’s price as indicative of fair value.76

Second, without the fraud-on-the-market presumption, plaintiffs
would not be able to bring Rule 10b-5 class actions.77 What is the
relevance of empirical evidence about anomalies in stock pricing, even
that some investors could opt to trade in a crooked market,78 to the
pragmatic view that federal securities class actions, as reformed by the
PSLRA, should continue to exist to deter future violations and achieve
at least some compensation for defrauded investors?79 Corporate
defendants and their supporters dispute the benefits of this litigation, but
both the Supreme Court and Congress have decided this question. Any
changes in policy must come from Congress.
V. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IS RIGHT: REAL PEOPLE ARE NOT
REASONABLE INVESTORS
Behavioral economics is right that real people investing in today’s
markets are not the “reasonable investors” the law expects them to be.80
75. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988).
76. Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities
Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 449 (2006).
77. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
78. According to Frederick Dunbar and Dana Heller, some rational investors are willing to
gamble that they can get out of the market before general public awareness of the fraud destroys
the market price of the stock. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 50, at 504. See also SHLEIFER, supra
note 46, at 154, 157 (asserting that rational speculators can destabilize prices and cause bubbles).
79. Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 817–18.
80. See supra notes 22–27.
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Yet, to date, behavioral economics has not caused any judicial reexamination of materiality or justifiable reliance in situations where
investors do not have the advantage of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption. Frequently, this occurs in situations where investors
allege fraud in face-to-face dealings with their brokers or other financial
advisers, where courts deny investors relief either because the
misleading disclosures were not material (because the reasonable
investor would not have relied on them81 or would already know the
correct information),82 or because the investor’s reliance on oral
representations was not reasonable since he could have discovered
corrective information in a lengthy disclosure document.83
Of course, as I have argued above with respect to the fraud-on-themarket presumption and the efficient market hypothesis, legal reality
and economic reality do not necessarily have to be in agreement. Policy
is the justification for legal fictions. Just as the fraud-on-the-market
presumption can stand even in the face of empirical evidence of market
inefficiencies, the law can ascribe characteristics to a reasonable
investor even though real investors may not possess them.
What then are the policy considerations to support a “reasonable
investor” standard that requires greater rationality than most investors
possess? Courts have not engaged in extensive policy analysis, but it
appears that courts want people to make sensible investment decisions,
and so they will deny them any recovery for their losses unless they live
up to the “reasonable investor” standard. Courts apparently believe that
if we treat investors like children, nitwits, or rubes, they will act that
way.84 Investing necessarily involves risk-taking; investors should not
play the game unless they know what they are doing.85
But is it good public policy to allow people to get away with fraud?
Torts scholars have pondered why the justifiable reliance standard86
should bar fraud victims from recovery. According to Dan Dobbs, it

81. See supra note 7.
82. See supra notes 8–13.
83. See supra note 21.
84. “One word encompasses all the grandeur and majesty of western civilization. That word
is ‘freedom’ . . . . Not as well recognized, but equally true is that the absolute concomitant of
freedom is responsibility . . . .” Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 587 So. 2d 273,
278 (Miss. 1991). Puckett dismissed fraud claims brought by a self-directed investor who lost
over $2 million, including his retirement fund, in commodities futures trading. Id.
85. See Levitin v. Paine Webber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the
decision to invest in stocks is a decision to forego safer interest-bearing opportunities in order to
seek out higher returns).
86. Justifiable reliance, unlike securities fraud, is a subjective standard. See supra notes 17–
19 and accompanying text.
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may be an indirect way to assess other issues, namely, whether the
plaintiff relied at all on a material misstatement and whether the
defendant made the misstatement to induce reliance. If the evidence
establishes these conditions, the defendant should be held liable, even if
plaintiff’s reliance appears foolish.87
Applying this reasoning to securities fraud, it is certainly true that
unhappy investors, having suffered a loss, may find it difficult to accept
that the broker-dealer or corporate management is not to blame for their
losses. This may cause them, after the fact, to put too much weight on,
and take out of context, statements that turned out to be incorrect.88 In
addition, there is a fair amount of suspicion, whether deserved or not,
about investors’ motives and worries about greedy investors seeking to
extort payment from their innocent advisers.89
One cognitive fallacy that courts have embraced is hindsight bias—
the concern that because something went wrong, its flaws should have
been apparent at the start. The fact that a broker’s recommendation did
not result in gains does not establish fraud or breach of duty on the
broker’s part; the fact that a corporation’s projections did not come to
pass does not establish scienter. Accordingly, courts must guard against
plaintiffs’ pleading “fraud by hindsight.”90 Out of concern for hindsight
bias, courts have increased the burden on plaintiffs to establish fraud.91
Unfortunately, however, courts have gone too far in imposing due
diligence obligations on investors. It is simply unrealistic to expect
unsophisticated investors to read lengthy disclosure documents, and
given their complexity, it would be a waste of investors’ time. Investors
may sensibly rely on the recommendations of their advisers who invite
their reliance and hold themselves out as trusted financial advisers and
should not be expected to fact-check their advisers’ recommendations.

87. DOBBS, supra note 17, § 474, at 1360–61.
88. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995) (stating that Congress did not
intend to extend liability for misstatements to “every casual communication between buyer and
seller”).
89. Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 463–64 (discussing concerns that imposing civil liability for
violations of industry standards “would be an invitation for disappointed customers to blackmail
their broker-dealers”).
90. See, e.g., Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 794–95 (7th Cir. 2009);
Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 927–30 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 775 (2004)
(recognizing that courts cite concerns with hindsight bias in nearly one-third of published
opinions in securities class action cases).
91. See Gulati et al., supra note 90, at 775 (“Increasingly, the doctrine against ‘fraud by
hindsight’ . . . has become a hurdle that plaintiffs in securities cases must overcome.”).
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CONCLUSION
To date, courts have considered behavioral economics in securities
regulation in two situations: (1) to cast doubt upon the fraud-on-themarket presumption in the context of class certification of securities
fraud class actions;92 and (2) to increase plaintiffs’ burden in
establishing fraud.93 The efficient market hypothesis, with its strong
belief in the efficiency of the markets, generally distrusts government
regulation.94 Yet the efficient market hypothesis provided additional
theoretical support to bolster pragmatic reasons for adopting the fraudon-the-market presumption. In contrast, behavioral economics, with its
emphasis on investors’ judgment errors, supports (at least to some
degree) government paternalism.95 It is exceedingly ironic that
behavioral economics, with its recognition of the cognitive fallibilities
of investors, has, to date, been asserted to reduce investor protection.96
The research from behavioral economics on cognitive failings has
much to offer in rethinking the artificial construct of a “reasonable
investor” and its resulting lack of protection for investors, particularly
unsophisticated retail investors. Despite their cognitive failings and
their lack of training for the task,97 investors are forced to invest in the
market to save for their retirement and for other expensive undertakings,
such as their children’s college education. Behavioral economics thus
supports the need for (at least some) paternalistic responses to cognitive
biases.98 Disclosure is not the panacea that drafters of federal securities

92. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 90–91.
94. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) (arguing that contract and
market-based approaches are preferable to regulation).
95. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159 (2003) (arguing that behavioral findings should be used to attempt to steer people’s
choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice). Gilson and
Kraakman recognize the need for paternalistic responses to cognitive bias, in particular to protect
retail investors and their retirement savings. MOME II, supra note 23, at 738.
96. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137 (2006)
(arguing that behavioral economics supports constraints on fraud-on-the-market because of
difficulties in assessing how markets react to information).
97. See Howell E. Jackson, To What Extent Should Individual Investors Rely on the
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: A Preliminary Investigation of Dispersion in Investor Returns,
28 J. CORP. L. 671, 686 (2003) (recommending that the SEC should focus on educating retail
investors about risks associated with equity investments, particularly the risks of undiversified
investments and investment strategies with high transaction costs).
98. Securities regulation must address a complex question, which two behavioral economists
aptly stated: “How can we allow people of varying abilities and financial sophistication to express
their preferences for investments without making them vulnerable to salespeople selling ‘snake
oil’?” GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
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laws may have thought it to be.99 For example, requiring mutual funds
to disclose fees and expenses has not deterred broker-dealers’ efforts to
persuade their brokerage customers to purchase expensive actively
managed proprietary mutual funds instead of low-cost index funds that
offer better returns.100
Where is behavioral economics when investors need it?

PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 175
(2009).
99. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 599 (2013) (arguing that disclosures cannot prevent market failure unless investors
carefully read those disclosures and appraise the security on its merits before investing).
100. See Mercer Bullard, Geoffrey C. Friesen & Travis Sapp, Investor Timing and Fund
Distribution Channels (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070545 (finding that
investors who transact through investment professionals in load-carrying mutual funds experience
substantially poorer timing performance than investors who purchase pure no-load funds). For an
encouraging sign that times may be changing, see Kirsten Grind, Investors Sour on Pro Stock
Pickers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2013, at A1 (reporting that in 2012, investors withdrew funds from
actively managed funds and shifted into lower-cost funds that track the market).

